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Abstract
Loan modiﬁcations oﬀer one strategy to prevent mortgage foreclosures by
lowering interest rates, extending loan terms and/or reducing principal bal-
ance owed. Yet modiﬁcations are largely at the discretion of loan servicers
and not as systematically transparent as loan application approvals and de-
nials. Who is oﬀered a modiﬁcation and what form of modiﬁcation they
receive could result in disparate impacts for low-income and minority com-
munities. This paper uses data on 105,769 non-agency securitized subprime
loans made in 2005 to examine the incidence of defaults and modiﬁcations
among loans managed by one large trustee of securitized loans covering 94
loan servicers in California, Oregon and Washington. Data from Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data is used to assess borrower characteristics.
The results suggest although loan modiﬁcations remain a rarely used op-
tion among the servicers in these data, there is no evidence that minority
borrowers are less likely to receive a modiﬁcation or less aggressive modi-
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Preprint submitted to San Francisco Federal Reserve February 9, 2011ﬁcation. These borrowers are more likely to be delinquent, but controlling
for delinquencies we ﬁnd no evidence of disparate impact. We also ﬁnd that
preliminary performance of loans post-modiﬁcation is positive, particularly
for minority borrowers. Generally modiﬁcations involve modest interest rate
reductions and increasing loan balances.
Keywords: Mortgage Default and Foreclosure; Housing Policy; Loan
Modiﬁcations
21. Introduction
Between 2008 and the ﬁrst half of 2010, an estimated 3.2 million mort-
gage loans in the United States have been modiﬁed in some form (Hope
Now, 2010). While these numbers still pale in contrast to the number of
defaults over the same time period, there is growing evidence that the scale
of loan modiﬁcations has increased with the advent of the federal Making
Home Aﬀordable program and the Home Aﬀordable Modiﬁcation Program
(or HAMP, see www.makinghomeaﬀordable.gov for details), and that these
modiﬁcations have led to fewer re-defaults than earlier voluntary loan mod-
iﬁcations that did little to change the payment terms on the loan. This is
good news, since eﬀective loan modiﬁcations have the potential to prevent
foreclosures and their negative impacts on borrowers, communities, and the
overall U.S. economy.
Yet, surprisingly, we know very little about these loan modiﬁcations and
their eﬀectiveness. Who received them? Are there any racial or ethnic dif-
ferences in the types of loan modiﬁcations received? Were the modiﬁcations
successful in preventing subsequent foreclosures? To date, data on loan mod-
iﬁcations have only been released in the aggregate, with no information about
the borrowers who have received modiﬁcations. For consumer advocates, this
lack of transparency is troubling, since anecdotal evidence from foreclosure
prevention counselors and legal aid groups suggests that the loan modiﬁca-
tion process is slow, confusing, and diﬃcult to navigate. Their concern is
that certain borrowers - for example, those with less ﬁnancial knowledge or
limited English - may be less likely to get a modiﬁcation, and/or less likely to
get a modiﬁcation that eﬀectively reduces monthly payment or the amount
owed on the mortgage.
In this paper, we use a unique dataset that merges data on the loan
performance of subprime home mortgages that are managed by Corporate
Trust Services (CTS) of Wells Fargo Bank with data on borrowers reported
as part of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). With these merged
data, we can provide some initial insights into who is receiving loan modi-
ﬁcations, what types of loan modiﬁcations they are receiving, and whether
or not those loan modiﬁcations are helping to prevent subsequent default.
Speciﬁcally, we explore whether or not there are racial and/or ethnic diﬀer-
ences in who receives a loan modiﬁcation and what kind of modiﬁcation they
receive.
Our ﬁndings suggest that, conditional on being in default, there are no
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tion, nor are there any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the types of modiﬁcations
received. In fact, we ﬁnd that controlling for a wide range of borrower, loan,
and housing and labor market characteristics, minorities are slightly more
likely to receive a loan modiﬁcation, and are also more likely to see greater
reductions in their interest rates. We also ﬁnd that a loan modiﬁcation signif-
icantly reduces the likelihood of subsequent default. These ﬁndings stand in
stark contrast to the literature on mortgage originations, which has revealed
persistent diﬀerences in loan outcomes by race and ethnicity in terms of loan
pricing and terms. We also ﬁnd a potentially important role of modiﬁcations
in boosting subsequent loan performance.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we provide some brief background
on the evolution of loan modiﬁcation eﬀorts as well as a review of the liter-
ature on loan modiﬁcations to date. Second, we describe the data used in
this paper as well as our modeling strategy. Third, we present our analytical
ﬁndings. In the ﬁnal section, we suggest avenues for additional research and
discuss the policy implications of the paper.
2. Evolution of Loan Modiﬁcation Eﬀorts
Mortgage loan servicers3 have a number of options open to them in re-
sponse to a borrower in default: approve a loan modiﬁcation, oﬀer an al-
ternative such as a short sale or other alternative to foreclosure, or pursue
a foreclosure. Servicers may pursue these options simultaneously, or even
encourage borrowers to submit modiﬁcation applications and then fail to act
on the application, request extensions and more data or require that the
borrower initiate the whole process again sometime down the road.
In addition to signiﬁcant variation in the loan modiﬁcation process, loans
can be modiﬁed in multiple ways, and not always in a way that is favorable
to the borrower. One of the most common forms of loan modiﬁcation occurs
when a servicer adds payment arrears to the total loan balance, and then
calculates a new monthly payment that will amortize the increased balance
3Although a mortgage loan may be serviced by a third party or by a lender directly, this
paper will use the term “servicer” to indicate the party responsible for reporting to lenders
and investors in a security about the status of each loan each month. Not all servicers
have the discretion to decide loan outcomes and decisions may be made in collaboration
with lenders and investors; for simplicity the term servicer will be used regardless.
4over the life of the loan. This type of modiﬁcation generally increases both
the monthly payment amount as well as the overall amount of debt. A
second type of modiﬁcation - generally used on adjustable rate mortgages -
is to freeze the interest rate and not allow it to reset at a higher rate. Third,
a servicer can permanently reduce the interest rate on a loan in order to
reduce the monthly payment, while leaving the balance of the mortgage the
same. Finally, servicers can choose to reduce principal debt, which reduces
the overall amount of the loan. A principal reduction is particularly beneﬁcial
to homeowners whose house values are signiﬁcantly lower than the amount
of their mortgage.
Federal policy-makers have focused on loan modiﬁcations as the primary
tool for preventing foreclosure. Modiﬁcations of loan terms oﬀer the possibil-
ity of addressing either of the two fundamental drivers of mortgage default:
a borrower’s inability to aﬀord their monthly payments or their lack of in-
centive to make these payments given that the value of their home is less
than the amount of mortgage debt owed. A successful loan modiﬁcation also
has the potential for larger ﬁnancial returns for mortgage lenders and in-
vestors than a foreclosure. Surrounding homeowners and communities could
also beneﬁt by reducing the number of foreclosed homes which may result in
depressed property values.
The federal Making Home Aﬀordable program and the Home Aﬀordable
Modiﬁcation Program (HAMP) allocated $75 billion to loan modiﬁcation
eﬀorts, with a goal of reaching 9 million distressed borrowers by December
2012. Under the program, eligible borrowers work with the servicer to reduce
their monthly payment to 38 percent of their income, and then HAMP pro-
vides a subsidy to further reduce the payment to 31 percent. Servicers also
receive an up-front fee of $1,000 for each modiﬁcation, plus “pay for success”
fees on performing modiﬁed loans of $1,000 per year for up to 5 years, thus
providing servicers a ﬁnancial incentive to initiate modiﬁcations.4 Borrowers
are eligible for a HAMP modiﬁcation on ﬁrst-lien loans for owner-occupied
properties with an unpaid principal balance of less than $729,750, originated
on or before January 1, 2009. All borrowers must document their income,
including a signed IRS 4506-T form to share tax data with the servicer, two
4HAMP also provides a bonus incentive of $1,500 to lender/investors and $500 to
servicers for modiﬁcations made while a borrower is still current on mortgage payments
but at imminent risk of default.
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davit of ﬁnancial hardship. Homeowners who make their payments on time
are eligible for up to $1,000 of principal reduction payments each year for up
to ﬁve years.
Although in theory, both borrower and investor are better oﬀ if a foreclo-
sure is avoided, in practice it has proven to be much more diﬃcult to modify
loans, and the number of modiﬁcations - both temporary and permanent -
still falls signiﬁcantly short of the number of distressed borrowers. In the ﬁrst
quarter of 2010, HAMP resulted in 164,000 permanent modiﬁcations. That
same quarter, the Mortgage Bankers Association reported that nearly 2.1
million borrowers were in some stage of the foreclosure process, and another
4.5 million borrowers were at least 30+ days past due. Signiﬁcant barri-
ers exist to increasing the scale of loan modiﬁcations (Cordell et al., 2010).
One of the biggest barriers has been the lack of incentives for servicers to
modify loans. Loan modiﬁcations are costly: they are both labor and time
intensive and cannot be easily automated. And unlike the costs associated
with foreclosure, neither the labor nor the overhead costs associated with
modiﬁcations are billable back to investors. As a result, servicers have very
little ﬁnancial incentive to undertake loan modiﬁcations. In addition, very
few servicers have invested in either the staﬀ or the technological capacity to
respond to the current volume of distressed borrowers.
Mortgage securitization is also believed to create barriers to modiﬁca-
tion (Eggert, 2007; Gelpern and Levitin, 2009; Pikorski et al., 2009). The
legal agreements governing mortgages held in private label securities require
servicers to initiate foreclosures on defaulted loans, yet provide little or no
guidance on how to do loan modiﬁcations. Servicers have expressed con-
cerns that loan modiﬁcations could trigger investor lawsuits claiming that
servicers are not fulﬁlling the contract nor meeting their obligation to max-
imize ﬁnancial returns for investors. Junior liens can also complicate the
loan renegotiation process; multiple investors with diﬀerent interests may
thwart servicers’ eﬀorts to provide the borrower with an eﬀective modiﬁca-
tion. However, some researchers have suggested that securitization is a red
herring when it comes to modiﬁcations, showing for example that loans held
in portfolio are no more or less likely to be modiﬁed than loans that are held
in mortgage backed securities (Adelino et al., 2009). Instead, they contend
that servicers are reluctant to modify loans for two key reasons. First, they
ﬁnd that approximately 30 percent of borrowers “self-cure,” meaning that
they bring their loan current on their own. In this instance, servicers would
6lose revenue unnecessarily by oﬀering a modiﬁcation. Second, servicers may
also be concerned that if a borrower re-defaults after a modiﬁcation, they
will have simply postponed foreclosure, and, if the housing market continues
to decline, the lender will recover even less in foreclosure in the future.
In addition to barriers on the servicing side, the loan modiﬁcation process
can also face complications on the borrower side. Although loan servicers are
directed by the US Department of Treasury and Department of Housing and
Urban Development to screen borrowers for eligibility for HAMP, in most
cases borrowers must opt in to the program, especially those who are not yet
in default but face a hardship and face imminent default (imminent default is
not readily observable by the servicer). Borrowers must complete application
forms much like those used in underwriting a loan, including an aﬃdavit of
hardship, proof of income and forms to release two years of federal income
tax forms. The lender then rejects or accepts the application based on if the
borrower meets the program guidelines regarding a documented hardship
and stable income, as well as if the loan meets a standardized net present
value test. Lenders may deny an application, fail to act on an application,
or approve an application.
A substantial percentage of delinquent borrowers fail to contact their
lender or servicer, which undercuts their ability to avoid foreclosure. Al-
though servicers reach out to delinquent borrowers in a variety of ways, a
signiﬁcant proportion of borrowers never speak with their servicer when they
ﬁnd themselves unable to make their mortgage payments (Collins, 2007).
Perhaps most alarmingly, Cutts and Merrill (2008) ﬁnd that 52 percent of
foreclosure sales lack reciprocal servicer contact, which undermines borrow-
ers’ ability to partner with their servicer to complete a workout. Because the
likelihood of retaining one’s home decreases the longer delinquent borrowers
delay contacting their servicers, connecting borrowers and servicers as early
as possible during the default period is critical to helping borrowers keep
their homes (Cutts and Merrill, 2008).
Given these complications, as well as the fact that loan modiﬁcations and
workouts are negotiated by private servicers on the telephone with individual
borrowers, there is the potential for the modiﬁcation process to present acute
challenges for historically underserved borrowers - lower-income and minority
borrowers in particular - who lack experience and knowledge of dealing with
a lending institution. For example, borrowers who do not speak English or
who may distrust banking institutions may fail to pursue a loan modiﬁcation
entirely, despite being eligible for a HAMP modiﬁcation. Lack of knowl-
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paperwork. Race or perceived race could serve as a proxy servicers use for
decision making on modiﬁcations, especially if these borrowers are deemed
less sophisticated, more time consuming and therefore more costly to serve.
Indeed, housing counselors and other intermediaries working with dis-
tressed borrowers have reported that they have witnessed signiﬁcant dispari-
ties in who receives a loan modiﬁcation, and that the lengthy and complicated
process can be particularly intimidating to those with limited English skills
and/or lack of experiences with the ﬁnancial services industry. Unfortunately,
there are no publicly available data on loan modiﬁcations by race or income
that allow us to analyze the hypothesis that there exist systemic inequali-
ties in who receives a loan modiﬁcation. This paper attempts to combine
available data to begin to explore this fundamental research question.
3. Literature Review
The incidence of loan modiﬁcations and the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent mod-
iﬁcation types are relatively new ﬁelds of research, and very little data have
been available for academic study. A few studies before the current ﬁnancial
crisis have examined informational asymmetries associated with loan modiﬁ-
cation (Ambrose and Capone, 1996; Riddiough and Wyatt, 1994a,b) and the
role that servicing and loss mitigation programs - primarily FHA loans and
those serviced by Freddie Mac - can play in sustaining homeownership for
lower-income households (Capone and Metz, 2003; Cutts and Green, 2005).
Not surprisingly, interest in loan modiﬁcations has risen exponentially in
recent years, and there are many research studies underway. The vast ma-
jority of these studies seek to inform loan modiﬁcation policy, and examine
whether contemporary loss mitigation eﬀorts, including loan modiﬁcations,
are helpful to borrowers.
A few consistent ﬁndings are emerging from these studies. First, despite
the policy emphasis on loan modiﬁcations as a solution to the foreclosure
crisis, very few loans are ever modiﬁed, and even fewer result in substantial
contract amendments such as principal reduction (White, 2009a,b). Even
with HAMP, the scale of modiﬁcations is still very small compared to the
number of seriously delinquent loans, with estimates ranging between 3 - 8
percent depending on how modiﬁcations are deﬁned (Adelino et al., 2009).
Second, research has shown that not all loan modiﬁcations are created
equal. White, for example, showed early on that most voluntary modiﬁca-
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as the principal owed on the loan (White, 2009a,b). Not surprisingly, early
studies analyzing the impacts of loan modiﬁcations found high rates of recidi-
vism and redefault (Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2008). More
recent research, however, has tried to tease out what matters when it comes
to successful loan modiﬁcation (Cordell et al., 2009; Cutts and Merrill, 2008;
Haughwout et al., 2010; Quercia and Ding, 2009). In general, the research
ﬁndings suggest that the most successful loan modiﬁcations are those that
result in a signiﬁcant decrease in either the monthly payments and/or the
principal of the loan. Quercia and Ding (2009), for example, ﬁnd that loans
with greater payment reductions have lower redefault risks, and that there
is an even lower level of redefault when payment reduction is accompanied
by principal reduction. The authors suggest that among the diﬀerent types
of modiﬁcations, the principal forgiveness modiﬁcation has the lowest rede-
fault rate. They also ﬁnd that the timing of the loan modiﬁcation matters -
early intervention yields better results. Borrowers who were current on their
payments were much less likely to re-default than borrowers who received
modiﬁcations after missing one or more payments. Cutts and Merrill (2008)
show that the success rate of modiﬁed loans varies by the amount of arrearage
capitalized into the loan modiﬁcation; they ﬁnd a direct relationship between
a lower arrearage and a lower redefault rate.
What is missing from these studies, however, is an analysis of how these
factors might diﬀer for diﬀerent types of borrowers. As noted above, some
borrowers may systematically fail to seek out and receive loan modiﬁcations.
Studies examining consumer behavior in the mortgage market have shown
that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in consumers’ ﬁnancial choices. Camp-
bell (2006), for instance, ﬁnds that consumers with less education are the
least likely to reﬁnance when the terms of their loan could be most improved.
Bucks and Pence (2008) show low-income mortgage borrowers are most likely
to underestimate how much the interest rate on their loan could change rel-
ative to their actual contract. Minority borrowers are 30 percent more likely
to not know their interest rate and low-income borrowers 28 percent more
likely. Similar eﬀects are shown for lesser educated borrowers. Low-income
consumers with less than a college degree are among the least accurate or
informed about the terms of their mortgage.
These studies suggest that some groups of consumers - lower income,
lesser educated and minority races - may systematically exhibit diﬀerential
behavior and may be less likely to seek out or receive a loan modiﬁcation. To
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modiﬁcations by race, researchers require a dataset that includes information
not only on loan performance and changes to the loan terms, but also on
borrower characteristics. To date, no such public dataset exists, greatly
limiting the ability to paint a complete picture of what is happening with
loan modiﬁcations. Collins (2009) provides an initial look at who receives
loan modiﬁcations by matching cross-sectional loan modiﬁcation data from
CTS to the characteristics of borrowers based on the zip code of where the
loan modiﬁcation was made. He ﬁnds that borrowers in lower-income or
higher share minority zip codes are not less likely to receive a modiﬁcation
or less aggressive modiﬁcations. In this paper, we extend this earlier work
by taking advantage of the panel nature of the CTS data and by matching
the individual loan records to loan originations in HMDA.
4. Data and Methods
For this analysis, we created a unique dataset that merges loan-level data
on subprime home mortgages that are managed by Corporate Trust Services
(CTS) of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., also known as the Columbia Collateral File,
with loan-level data on borrowers from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA). This merged dataset allows us to not only track the performance
of loans and the incidence of loan modiﬁcations, but also analyze whether
or not there are diﬀerences in loan modiﬁcation rates and terms by race and
ethnicity of the borrower.
CTS is a service of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. that provides information on
a variety of investment vehicles administered by the bank. The CTS data
covers securitized mortgages for which Wells Fargo serves as the trustee, and
includes mortgages with diﬀerent interest rate structures, diﬀerent purposes,
diﬀerent property types, and diﬀerent lien statuses (Quercia and Ding, 2009;
White, 2009b).5 The database includes loans originated as early as the 1980s
and tracks performance until the loan is paid oﬀ or foreclosed upon, and
includes over 4 million individual loans. Each monthly loan record contains
the borrower’s FICO credit score, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at origination,
the last 12 month’s delinquency history, the property zip code, the type of
loan, and the original and current balance of the loan. The reports also have
5These investor report ﬁles are available at www.ctslink.com, administered by the Cor-
porate Trust Services group of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
10information about the loan balance, mortgage payment, and interest rate,
both before and after modiﬁcation, which enables us to identify whether
total mortgage debt, interest rate, or mortgage payments are changed for
individual homeowners.
The CTS data, however, does not include any information on the bor-
rower other than their FICO score. For this reason, we merge the CTS data
with loan level HMDA data. HMDA data provide information on the race
and ethnicity of the borrower, their income, and the geographic location of
the property securing the loan. Since 2004, the HMDA data also includes
information on whether or not the loan was “higher-priced,” deﬁned as ﬁrst
lien mortgages with an annual percentage rate (APR) three percentage points
over the comparable-maturity Treasury benchmark.
To match the data, we sorted CTS and HMDA loans into the census tracts
of the purchased property using a geographic crosswalk ﬁle, and then matched
loan originations on the following variables: origination date, loan amount,
lien status, and loan purpose. We limited the matching to loans originated
between 2004 and 2007, and garnered a 69.2 percent match rate. For this
paper, we examine loans originated in three states: California, Oregon and
Washington. By limiting our analysis to a few states, we are able to take full
advantage of the panel data in the CTS, and minimize the likelihood that
our ﬁndings are driven by diﬀerences in state laws regarding foreclosures- all
three states are primarily non-judicial foreclosure states.
In addition, we limit our analysis to loans originated in 2005 for three
reasons: it represents the peak of the subprime lending boom in these three
states, the match rate for 2005 was over 75 percent, and it allows us to track
loan performance and modiﬁcations for at least 3 years after origination.
With these restrictions, we are left with a dataset of 105,769 observations.
From this core set of loans, we created a panel dataset with one observation
per loan per month until the loan is terminated through foreclosure, prepay-
ment or right censoring. Loan performance is observed for 39 months, from
December 2006 through May 2010. All loans were made in 2005 and are
observed in December 2006, but not all loans are observed in every period.
Loans may be paid oﬀ or lost to foreclosure.
One signiﬁcant limitation of the CTS data is its coverage of the mortgage
market, in particular, the lack of coverage of prime loans and loans held by
banks in portfolio. Nevertheless, given that subprime mortgages account for
more than half of all foreclosures, and that the vast majority of subprime
loans that led to the crisis were securitized, this sample provides important
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tial that modiﬁcations are more challenging among non-agency securitized
loans (meaning loans not managed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or Ginnie
Mae), this sample is particularly relevant for policy-makers.
5. Variable Deﬁnitions
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the loans in our sample. The av-
erage loan amount for the loans in our sample is $395,007, reﬂecting the high
cost of housing in California, Oregon, and Washington. The mean income as
reported in the loan application is also high, at nearly $127,000. Just under
half (46 percent) of the loans were used for home purchase, and the majority
of loans are adjustable rate mortgages (85 percent). The data also show the
weakness of subprime mortgages that were bundled into mortgage backed
securities. Thirty-two percent of the loans were high- cost, the mean FICO
scores was 689, and 34.3 percent of the sample became 60+ delinquent at
least once by May 2010. Only 6.8 percent of loans in the sample had received
a permanent modiﬁcation. As noted above, the modiﬁcation process is not
necessarily straightforward, and under HAMP, borrowers are ﬁrst oﬀered a
trial modiﬁcation before the contract changes are made permanent. In our
analysis, we only consider permanent, not trial, modiﬁcations.
Because we have a panel dataset, we include both ﬁxed and time vary-
ing explanatory variables in the models. Fixed covariates include the loan
amount at origination, income at origination, the combined loan to value
ratio at origination , loan purpose (purchase versus reﬁnance), whether or
not the loan was higher-priced, monthly payment to income, and the race
and ethnicity of the borrower. Loan amount and income are both log trans-
formed. Loan purpose is coded as a dummy variable, with “1” signifying
that the loan was used to purchase the property. We code the race and
ethnicity variables in the HMDA data as “Black\African American,” “His-
panic\Latino,” and “Asian\Hawaiian\Paciﬁc Islander.”6 While the plurality
of borrowers are white (49.5 percent), the sample also includes 31.5 percent
Hispanic\Latino borrowers, 13.8 percent Asian borrowers, and 5.2 percent
Black\African American borrowers.
Time-varying covariates, which are reported on a monthly basis, include
the performance of the loan, current FICO score, whether the loan has an
6Also includes small percentage of Native American and other races.
12adjustable interest rate, and the current interest rate on the loan.7 In the
models, we include two measures of FICO score to account for nonlineari-
ties. In addition to information about the borrower and the loan, we include
housing and labor market variables that could aﬀect loan performance. For
house prices, we use the Federal Housing Finance Agency House Price Index,
measured in the current month as well as 6 months ago. Sample means show
that MSA house prices have dropped dramatically between the origination of
loans in 2005 and May 2010, with the FHFA HPI dropping from 308 to 244.
Monthly data on the unemployment rate at the MSA level are obtained from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We also include the prevailing contract inter-
est rate on commitments for conventional ﬁxed rate mortgages from Freddie
Mac.
6. Model
Our empirical analysis focuses on four inter-related questions. First, con-
trolling for borrower risk factors, loan characteristics, and labor and housing
market conditions, who loses a home to foreclosure? Second, for borrowers
who are in distress, who gets a modiﬁcation? Third, for borrowers in distress,
does a modiﬁcation reduce the likelihood of a subsequent foreclosure? And
fourth, does a modiﬁcation result in a signiﬁcant rewriting of the mortgage
contract, such as a reduced interest rate and/or principal balance?
For the ﬁrst question regarding the incidence of REO (real estate owned)
by loan and borrower characteristics we use a competing risks speciﬁcation.
Mortgages are terminated not only when a borrower is foreclosed upon and
the loan goes into REO, but also when the borrower pays oﬀ the loan (e.g.,
by selling or reﬁnancing the house). We deﬁne the foreclosure as the point in
time where the property becomes REO as the borrower has likely lost their
home and this is a terminal state. Likewise “paid oﬀ” is also a terminal state.
The Stata module, STCRREG, based upon Fine and Gray’s (1999) method
is used to estimate a maximum likelihood, competing risks regression model
on a standard Cox regression.
Our second question regards the incidence of modiﬁcations. For this
analysis the data is restricted to those loans being 60+ days delinquent.
Making this conditional restriction focuses on loans most likely to receive
7Models were also testing using only FICO at origination, ﬁnding negligible diﬀerences.
Time variance of FICO score is minimal in cross section.
13a modiﬁcation. This speciﬁcation also relies on survival analysis but does
not use a competing risk framework since a loan is either modiﬁed or not,
and once it is modiﬁed it is always modiﬁed. Modiﬁcations as a function of
various explanatory variables is a hazard function.
For the third question, regarding the eﬀects of a modiﬁcation on loan per-
formance, we again use a competing risks framework as in the ﬁrst analysis.
However, here the data are again restricted to those loans which are at least
60+ days delinquent at some point in the study period and an indicator is
added for a loan after receiving a modiﬁcation.
For the fourth question, where we assess whether or not a loan modiﬁ-
cation results in signiﬁcant contract changes, we adopt a diﬀerence in dif-
ference analysis which compares the a loan pre-modiﬁcation to itself in the
post-modiﬁcation period. The model is a standard Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression on panel data. We assess two possible changes to the loan
contract: whether or not there is a signiﬁcant change in the interest rate on
the loan (leading to changes in the monthly payments) and whether or not
there is a change in principal owed on the loan. This model includes a covari-
ate for a month in which a modiﬁcation is in place. This therefore estimates
the eﬀects of modiﬁcation relative to the prior pre-modiﬁcation periods for
each loan.
For all of these models the same reduced form speciﬁcation is used:
Yi,t =
αi,t + β1i(Ln Loan Amt) + β2i(Subprime) + β3i(CLTV) + β4i(Purchase)
+ β5i(Race) + β6i(Ln Income) + β7i,t(ARM) + β8i,t(FICO) (1)
+ β9i,t(HPI) + β10i,t(Unemp Rate) + β11i,t(Delinquency)
+ β12t(PMMS) + β13t(Post Mod) + γi(Servicer Fixed Eﬀect) + ε
where β1 to β6 are measured on loan i at origination and do not vary over
time, while β7 to β11 vary over loan i and period t. β12 varies over time but
not loan i. Servicer ﬁxed eﬀect is measured using γi for loan i over all periods.
β13 is included only in models testing for the eﬀects of modiﬁcations on loan
terms. The models are run such that race and income, which are expected
to correlated, are examined individually and jointly. Likewise, the subprime
indicator, which is expected to be correlated with race, is also omitted from
one version of each model.
147. Findings
Figure 1 presents a simple graph of the 60+ day delinquency rate for
our diﬀerent race and ethnicity categories by date. Overall, the CTS data
reaﬃrms ﬁndings from other research projects that have shown that His-
panics/Latinos and Blacks/African Americans have experienced higher rates
of delinquencies and foreclosures than whites and Asians. The ﬁgure also
shows diﬀerences in the timing of delinquencies. For Hispanics and Blacks,
the delinquency rate began to rise quite steeply after the 3rd quarter of 2007;
for whites and Asians, the increase begins approximately a year later. This
diﬀerence in timing has implications for racial diﬀerences in loan modiﬁca-
tions. As Figure 2 shows, loan modiﬁcations were practically non-existent
before the third quarter of 2008, and only began to rise signiﬁcantly in 2009,
after the HAMP program was announced.
In Figures 3 and 4, we present descriptive statistics on the characteris-
tics of borrowers who received a loan modiﬁcation, conditional on being 60+
days delinquent. Approximately 11 percent of Blacks and 9 percent of His-
panics received a loan modiﬁcation, compared with 5 percent of Whites and
6 percent of Asians. This provides preliminary evidence that minorities are
no less likely to receive a loan modiﬁcation than other borrowers. In con-
trast, there is very little variation in the incidence of loan modiﬁcations by
income, although low-income households are slightly less likely to receive a
loan modiﬁcation (5 percent) than are middle- and high-income households
(7 percent).
In Table 2, we present the results of our ﬁrst competing risks model which
predicts the likelihood of a foreclosure (measured when the property reverts
back to the bank as REO) versus prepayment. Column 1 presents the results
without either the race or income of the borrower, column 2 presents the
results with only race, column 3 presents the results with only income, and
column 4 presents the results with both race and income included. Coeﬃ-
cients are reported as hazard ratios, with the standard errors in parenthesis.
The results of the model are consistent with expectations. We ﬁnd that
higher-priced loans increase the likelihood of foreclosure, as do loans with a
higher combined loan to value ratio. A history of delinquency also signiﬁ-
cantly increases the likelihood of foreclosure. The eﬀect of the downturn in
the housing market post-2006 is also evident in the data. Higher MSA house
prices in the current month decrease the likelihood of foreclosure, whereas
areas that had higher house prices six months prior increase the likelihood
15of foreclosure. This is consistent with other research which has shown that
declining house values are a strong predictor of default (Doms et al., 2007).
Income at origination does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on foreclosure; two
factors may explain this ﬁnding. First, income is measured at origination, so
it is possible that a subsequent drop in income is what triggers foreclosure
(which we would not pick up on). Second, the loan amount variable likely
serves as a strong proxy for income; we ﬁnd that as the loan amount goes up,
the risk of foreclosure goes down. In terms of borrower race and ethnicity,
we ﬁnd that Hispanics and Asians/Hawaiian Paciﬁc Islanders are more likely
to lose their home to foreclosure than Whites, after controlling for the other
variables in the model. We do not see the same eﬀect for Blacks/African
Americans. This is surprising, since other research has shown that Blacks are
more likely to be in foreclosure, and even the descriptive statistics presented
above show a higher 60+ delinquency rate for Blacks than for Whites. We
believe this discrepancy is due to how we deﬁne “foreclosure.” While Blacks
are more likely to be in foreclosure, these properties do not reach the REO
stage at the same rate as other borrowers. This leads us to hypothesize
that there are neighborhood level diﬀerences in what properties convert to
REOs: for example, in some neighborhoods a foreclosure may result in a
short sale, which would still entail a loss of the home for the borrower but
would not be recorded as an REO in the data. Similarly, we do not see a
strong relationship between lower FICO scores and higher probabilities of
REO. Other researchers studying the timing and paths of the foreclosure
process have found the same (Chan et al., June 29, 2010). Omitting the
subprime indicator has no material eﬀects on race or other key variables.
Servicer ﬁxed eﬀects, used as a means to proxy for unobserved mechanisms
that could lead borrowers to certain servicers by location or market segment,
also serves to aﬃrm or amplify the results for key explanatory variables.
Next we turn to the central question of this paper regarding which bor-
rowers are more likely to receive a mortgage modiﬁcation. In Table 3 we
model the likelihood of getting a loan modiﬁcation, conditional on being at
least 60+ days delinquent. In this model, we do not ﬁnd any racial or ethnic
disparities in who receives a modiﬁcation. In fact, Blacks/African Americans
are slightly more likely to receive a loan modiﬁcation than whites. Impor-
tantly, modiﬁcations are also more common among borrowers who initially
received a high-cost loan. It also does not appear that servicers are basing
their loan modiﬁcations on local housing and/or labor market conditions.
Neither the current house price index nor the local unemployment rate has
16any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood of receiving a loan modiﬁcation. While
these results suggest that loan modiﬁcations are relatively evenly distributed
across borrowers - regardless of race and/or ethnicity - it does not entirely
erase the possibility of disparities in who gets a loan modiﬁcation. One thing
we cannot assess is whether there are diﬀerences in who gets a loan modiﬁ-
cation among those who applied for one. In other words, we do not see loan
modiﬁcation denial or non-completion rates. However, there do not appear
to be any systematic racial biases among existing loan modiﬁcations. When
omitting the subprime indicator or adding servicer ﬁxed eﬀects it in fact
appears that minorties are modestly more likely to receive a modiﬁcation
conditional on being delinquent.
Our second question was whether or not loan modiﬁcations help to pre-
vent subsequent foreclosure. In other words, do loan modiﬁcations work?
Table 4 presents this analysis. Like Table 2, we run a competing risks re-
gression on the likelihood of losing one’s home to foreclosure, but this time
we include a parameter which indicates whether or not the loan received a
permanent modiﬁcation and restrict the analysis to loans with at least one
delinquency. First, loans that received a modiﬁcation are more than two-
thirds less likely to end up in REO than are loans that do not receive a
modiﬁcation. The strength of this eﬀect may be due in part to the fact that
we only consider permanent modiﬁcations, which would select for borrowers
with both the motivation and capacity to make their temporary modiﬁca-
tion payments and submit proper documentation. Second, while Hispan-
ics and Asians/Hawaiian Paciﬁc Islanders are still slightly more likely to
lose their home to foreclosure, when we examine the interaction eﬀects be-
tween race/ethnicity and loan modiﬁcation, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
In other words, among Blacks/African Americans, Hispanics/Latinos and
Asians who received a loan modiﬁcation, there is no longer an elevated risk
of foreclosure. These results suggest that loan modiﬁcations are an eﬀective
way of preventing foreclosure for this population.
For the next stage of the analysis, we consider whether or not loan mod-
iﬁcations signiﬁcantly changed the contract terms on the loan. We ﬁnd that
a loan modiﬁcation signiﬁcantly reduces the interest rate on the loan. On
average, modiﬁed loans see a reduction in the interest rate of between 1.65
and 1.76 percentage points of interest depending on the speciﬁcation (Ta-
ble 5). We also do not ﬁnd any racial disparities in who gets an interest
rate reduction. While on average, Blacks/African Americans pay a slightly
higher interest rate, approximately 11 basis points, than whites, Blacks who
17received a loan modiﬁcation pay a bit less - an additional drop of 17 basis
points (although not statistically signiﬁcant). Hispanics/Latinos and Asians
who received a modiﬁcation also see an added reduction in their interest
rates.
In our ﬁnal Table (6), we examine the eﬀect of a loan modiﬁcation on
the outstanding balance of the loan. Research has shown that loans that
include a reduction in the principal amount are less likely to redefault than
loans with only payment changes. Especially given the dramatic house price
declines in California, principal reductions as a result of a loan modiﬁcation
are likely to be an important part of foreclosure prevention. However, we
ﬁnd that most servicers are still adding missed payments onto the remaining
principal of the loan. Modiﬁed loans see an increase in their loan balance
ranging between $7,400 and $8,160, depending on the model speciﬁcation.
When we interact the loan modiﬁcation indicator with race, we ﬁnd that the
loan balance of Hispanics and Asians goes up less than that for whites, but we
do not see a signiﬁcant eﬀect for Blacks. Overall, few borrowers are receiving
principal reductions, and are instead ﬁnding that their missed payments are
being rolled into their loan balance.
8. Conclusions
Confronted with a rising number of foreclosures, the federal government
launched HAMP in 2009 with a goal of greatly increasing the scale and
impact of loan modiﬁcations. While the program has fallen far short of ex-
pectations, we ﬁnd that HAMP has led to an increase in loan modiﬁcations,
and that these modiﬁcations are successfully lowering the likelihood of re-
default. Importantly, we also ﬁnd no evidence of racial disparities among
those who receive loan modiﬁcations. In fact, we ﬁnd that Blacks/African
Americans, Hispanics/Latinos and Asians are slightly more likely to receive
a loan modiﬁcation, and that these loan modiﬁcations have slightly larger
reductions in their interest rate than those of similarly situated white bor-
rowers. These ﬁndings stand in stark contrast to the literature on mortgage
originations, which has revealed persistent diﬀerences in loan outcomes by
race and ethnicity in terms of loan pricing and terms (Avery et al., 2006;
Bocian et al., 2008; Nichols et al., 2004).
While this is good news, it is important to note that we cannot assess
who applied for and did not receive a loan modiﬁcation. In other words,
in research on mortgage originations using HMDA data, we can assess both
18diﬀerences in denial rates as well as diﬀerences in loan pricing. With the
CTS data, we can only examine who receives a permanent modiﬁcation, the
nature of the modiﬁcation and what subsequently happens to borrowers who
receive a loan modiﬁcation. If Black or Hispanic borrowers applied for a loan
modiﬁcation at higher rates than white borrowers, and were either denied
a permanent modiﬁcation or were thwarted by the lengthy and confusing
application process, racial and ethnic disparities in the loan modiﬁcation
process could still exist. In addition, the CTS data represent only a slice
of the overall mortgage market, and it may be that the sample of subprime
loans in private-label securities does not represent what is happening with
loan modiﬁcations in general. The paucity of publicly available data greatly
limits the ability of researchers to answer the important questions surround-
ing mortgage transactions and the potential disparate impacts on diﬀerent
groups.
In addition, we believe our ﬁndings highlight the need for further research
to help tease out what is responsible for these positive outcomes. Are there
lessons from the loan modiﬁcation process that could help us to design more
sustainable paths to homeownership going forward? For example, one pos-
sible explanation for the lack of disparities along race or income is the role
that housing counselors have played in the foreclosure prevention process.
Does the presence of a trusted intermediary, who may be able to navigate
the complicated world of loan modiﬁcations on the borrower’s behalf, help
to ensure more equitable loan modiﬁcation outcomes? What aspects of fore-
closure prevention campaigns led borrowers to apply for a loan modiﬁca-
tion or know where to seek out help? Recent studies examining the role of
counseling for mortgage borrowers in default are suggestive that counseling
and related interventions may in fact play a role for successfully avoiding
foreclosure. Ding, Quercia, and Ratcliﬀe (2008) examine the association
between telephone-based default counseling and the likelihood of curing a
delinquency among loans made to low-income borrowers. Studies by Collins
and Schmeiser (2010) and a preliminary evaluation of the National Foreclo-
sure Mitigation Counseling Program (Mayer et al., 2009) also ﬁnd positive
impacts of default counseling on loan outcomes.
Alternatively, has the oversight and structure of the HAMP program itself
helped to provide a protective frame around the loan modiﬁcation process?
Servicers and lenders have much less discretion due to the strong role of the
public sector in overseeing the mortgage market since the crisis. It is notable
that in 2009 HMDA data on loan denials shows a narrowing of racial gaps.
19This may be due to the dominance of government sponsored enterprises and
the FHA reducing lender discretion in the mortgage origination market. The
highly structured processes may serve to level the ﬁeld for traditionally un-
derserved borrowers. The answers to these questions could help us to develop
strategies to overcome information asymmetries and other vulnerabilities in
the mortgage market, especially for underserved borrowers.
Finally, despite the positive ﬁndings, it is worth emphasizing that the
scale of loan modiﬁcations is still falling well short of impending foreclo-
sures. In addition, the continued reluctance of servicers to reduce principal
balance may limit the eﬀectiveness of modiﬁcations, especially in areas that
have seen drastic declines in house prices (Quercia and Ding, 2009). More
research is needed to understand the links between local market conditions,
loan modiﬁcation, and foreclosure prevention over the long term.
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24Figure 1: 60+ Days Delinquent by Date and Race
Figure 2: Modiﬁcations by Date and Race, Conditional on 60+ Days
Delinquent
25Figure 3: Modiﬁcations by Race
Figure 4: Modiﬁcations by Income
26Table 2: Loss of Home to Foreclosure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Period 1 Loan Characteristics
High Cost Loan (>300 BPS Indicator) 1.172∗∗∗ 1.154∗∗∗ 1.172∗∗∗ 1.153∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
Natural Log Loan Amount ($) 0.850∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗ 0.832∗∗ 0.814∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.041)
Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio 1.020∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Monthly Payment to Income Ratio x 100 1.001 1.002 1.001 1.001 .997 0.994
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Purchase Mortgage Indicator 1.258∗∗∗ 1.234∗∗∗ 1.258∗∗∗ 1.232∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗ 1.229∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026)
Black\African American Indicator 0.984 0.985 1.014 0.945
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.033)
Hispanic\Latino Indicator 1.159∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗ 1.183∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022)
Asian\Hawaiian\Paciﬁc Islander Indicator 1.210∗∗∗ 1.210∗∗∗ 1.223∗∗∗ 1.172∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031)
Natural Log Income ($) 0.999 1.018 1.032 1.088
(0.056) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058)
Time Varying Characteristics
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) Indicator 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 0.999
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Current FICO Score/100 1.019 1.019 1.019 1.019 1.023∗ 1.041∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Current FICO Score2 0.998∗ 0.998∗ 0.998∗ 0.998∗ .998∗ 0.997∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI) 0.921∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ .922∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log Quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI) 6 months lag 1.044∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗ 1.044∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗ 1.01
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Monthly Unemployment Rate (MSA) x 100 1.000 0.999∗ 1.000 0.999∗ .999∗ 0.998∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interest Rate x 100 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001∗ 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Months Delinquent as of Current Month 1.145∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Months Delinquent as of 3 Months Ago 1.168∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Months Delinquent as of 6 Months Ago 1.010∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Freddie Mac PMMS - Current Month x 100 1.071∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.077∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
Servicer Fixed Eﬀects No No No No No Yes
Number of Observations 2,622,318 2,622,318 2,622,318 2,622,318 2,622,318 2,622,318
Number of Subjects 105,769 105,769 105,769 105,769 105,769 105,769
REO 16,390 16,390 16,390 16,390 16,390 16,390
Prepay 42,636 42,636 42,636 42,636 42,636 42,636
Exponentiated coeﬃcients
Source: Corporate Trust Services (CTS)
Performance period: December, 2006 - May, 2010
Loan Origination Year: 2005
Model: Competing Risks Model
Dependent Variable: Foreclosure (REO) is Event of Interest and Prepayment is Competing Event
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
27Table 3: Probability of Mortgage Modiﬁcation Conditional on Ever
Becoming Delinquent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Period 1 Loan Characteristics
High Cost Loan (>300 BPS Indicator) 2.589∗∗∗ 2.569∗∗∗ 2.570∗∗∗ 2.547∗∗∗ 2.089∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.092) (0.094) (0.093) (0.084)
Natural Log Loan Amount ($) 0.953 0.952 0.859 0.854 0.553∗∗∗ 0.822∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.077) (0.077) (0.052) (0.081)
Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio 1.010∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗ 1.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Monthly Payment to Income Ratio x 100 0.974∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗ 0.961∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Purchase Mortgage Indicator 0.881∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.920∗ 0.942
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038)
Black\African American Indicator 1.142∗ 1.146∗ 1.437∗∗∗ 1.175∗
(0.077) (0.077) (0.087) (0.082)
Hispanic\Latino Indicator 0.996 0.999 1.136∗∗∗ 0.970
(0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037)
Asian\Hawaiian\Paciﬁc Islander Indicator 0.997 0.999 1.056 1.011
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Natural Log Income ($) 1.121 1.126 1.644∗∗∗ 1.194
(0.097) (0.097) (0.153) (0.115)
Time Varying Characteristics
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) Indicator 0.977∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Current FICO Score/100 0.990 0.991 0.990 0.991 1.013 0.966∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Current FICO Score2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.997∗∗∗ 1.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI) 0.979 0.980 0.979 0.980 0.979 0.979
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Log Quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI) 6 months lag 1.044∗∗ 1.043∗ 1.044∗∗ 1.043∗ 1.044∗∗ 1.043∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Monthly Unemployment Rate (MSA) x 100 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Interest Rate x 100 0.980∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Months Delinquent as of Current Month 0.947∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Months Delinquent as of 3 Months Ago 1.041∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 1.038∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Months Delinquent as of 6 Months Ago 0.987∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Freddie Mac PMMS - Current Month x 100 0.858∗ 0.858∗ 0.858 0.858 0.898 0.778∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.110) (0.034)
Servicer Fixed Eﬀects No No No No No Yes
Total Observations 1,025,532 1,025,532 1,025,532 1,025,532 1,025,532 1,025,532
Unique Loans 36,248 36,248 36,248 36,248 36,248 36,248
Exponentiated coeﬃcients
Source: Corporate Trust Services (CTS)
Performance period: December, 2006 - May, 2010
Loan Origination Year: 2005
Model: Cox Hazard Model
Dependent Variable: Modiﬁcation
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
28Table 4: Probability of Loss of Home to Foreclosure Conditional on Ever
Becoming Delinquent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Period 1 Loan Characteristics
High Cost Loan (>300 BPS Indicator) 1.087∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Natural Log Loan Amount ($) 0.855∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031)
Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio 1.009∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Monthly Payment to Income Ratio x 100 1.001 1.001 1.002 1.001 1.000 0.996
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Purchase Mortgage Indicator 1.185∗∗∗ 1.173∗∗∗ 1.186∗∗∗ 1.173∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ 1.165∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Modiﬁcation Indicator 0.274∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Black\African American Indicator 0.932 0.932 0.946 0.911∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.031)
Hispanic\Latino Indicator 1.059∗∗ 1.059∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 1.017
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Asian\Hawaiian\Paciﬁc Islander Indicator 1.108∗∗∗ 1.108∗∗∗ 1.114∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Modiﬁcation Indicator x Black 1.003 1.003 1.004 0.991
(0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.147)
Modiﬁcation Indicator x Hispanic 0.956 0.956 0.953 0.929
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.089)
Modiﬁcation Indicator x Other 1.045 1.045 1.049 1.053
(0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.149)
Natural Log Income ($) 0.997 1.002 1.008 1.072
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041)
Time Varying Characteristics
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) Indicator 0.996∗∗ 0.996∗∗ 0.996∗∗ 0.996∗∗ 0.996∗ 0.995∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Current FICO Score/100 0.968∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗ 0.994
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Current FICO Score2 1.003∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 1.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI) 0.937∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log Quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI) 6 months lag 1.042∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗ 1.019
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Monthly Unemployment Rate (MSA) x 100 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interest Rate x 100 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001∗ 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Months Delinquent as of Current Month 4.081∗∗∗ 4.094∗∗∗ 4.082∗∗∗ 4.093∗∗∗ 4.115∗∗∗ 4.077∗∗∗
(0.861) (0.864) (0.861) (0.864) (0.869) (0.860)
Months Delinquent as of 3 Months Ago 1.182∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗ 1.178∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Months Delinquent as of 6 Months Ago 1.011∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Freddie Mac PMMS - Current Month x 100 0.797∗∗ 0.801∗∗ 0.797∗∗ 0.801∗∗ 0.803∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.045)
Servicer Fixed Eﬀects No No No No No Yes
Number of Observations 997,592 997,592 997,592 997,592 997,592 997,592
Number of Subjects 36,248 36,248 36,248 36,248 36,248 36,248
REO 16,388 16,388 16,388 16,388 16,388 16,388
Prepay 5,103 5,103 5,103 5,103 5,103 5,103
Exponentiated coeﬃcients
Source: Corporate Trust Services (CTS)
Performance period: December, 2006 - May, 2010
Loan Origination Year: 2005
Model: Competing Risks Model
Dependent Variable: Foreclosure (REO) is Event of Interest and Prepayment is Competing Event
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
29Table 5: Interest Rate on Loans Conditional on Receiving a Loan
Modiﬁcation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
High Cost Loan (>300 BPS Indicator) 0.786∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031)
Natural Log Loan Amount ($) -0.337∗∗∗ -0.336∗∗∗ -1.062∗∗∗ -1.060∗∗∗ -1.350∗∗∗ -0.992∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.086) (0.087) (0.106) (0.103)
Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003∗ -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Purchase Mortgage Indicator -0.012 -0.007 -0.085∗∗ -0.081∗∗ 0.000 -0.075∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.028)
Monthly Payment to Income Ratio x 100 -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.019)
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) Indicator 0.078∗ 0.078∗ 0.090∗ 0.089∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.090∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Current FICO Score/100 -1.154∗∗∗ -1.147∗∗∗ -1.254∗∗∗ -1.245∗∗∗ -0.817∗∗ -1.466∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.258) (0.255) (0.256) (0.264) (0.251)
Current FICO Score2 0.058∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.029 0.087∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Log Quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI) -4.890∗∗∗ -4.881∗∗∗ -4.889∗∗∗ -4.880∗∗∗ -4.861∗∗∗ -4.881∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
Log Quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI) 6 months lag 3.804∗∗∗ 3.782∗∗∗ 3.807∗∗∗ 3.781∗∗∗ 3.760∗∗∗ 3.780∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.189) (0.188) (0.189) (0.189) (0.191)
Monthly Unemployment Rate (MSA) x 100 -0.158∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Months Delinquent as of Current Month 0.222∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Months Delinquent as of 3 Months Ago -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Months Delinquent as of 6 Months Ago -0.028∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Freddie Mac PMMS - Current Month x 100 -0.073∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Post Modiﬁcation Indicator -1.759∗∗∗ -1.665∗∗∗ -1.754∗∗∗ -1.660∗∗∗ -1.649∗∗∗ -1.667∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.044) (0.031) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Black\African American Indicator 0.050 0.093 0.228∗∗∗ 0.112∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.049)
Hispanic\Latino Indicator 0.002 0.030 0.106∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
Asian\Hawaiian\Paciﬁc Islander Indicator 0.050 0.065 0.087 0.095∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044)
Modiﬁcation Indicator x Black -0.173 -0.174 -0.174 -0.173
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
Modiﬁcation Indicator x Hispanic -0.133∗ -0.133∗ -0.134∗ -0.131∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Modiﬁcation Indicator x Other -0.173∗ -0.173∗ -0.174∗ -0.174∗
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
Natural Log Income ($) 0.840∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.089) (0.115) (0.105)
Constant 23.535∗∗∗ 23.566∗∗∗ 23.792∗∗∗ 23.808∗∗∗ 23.929∗∗∗ 25.028∗∗∗
(1.140) (1.136) (1.129) (1.126) (1.167) (1.146)
Servicer Fixed Eﬀects No No No No No Yes
Total Observations 223,352 223,352 223,352 223,352 223,352 223,352
Unique Loans 5,745 5,745 5,745 5,745 5,745 5,745
R2 within 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460
R2 between 0.274 0.275 0.302 0.303 0.222 0.398
R2 overall 0.398 0.398 0.407 0.407 0.379 0.439
Source: Corporate Trust Services (CTS)
Performance period: December, 2006 - May, 2010
Loan Origination Year: 2005
Model: Random Eﬀects Linear Regression
Dependent Variable: Interest Rate
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 30Table 6: Current Balance on Loans Conditional on Receiving a Loan
Modiﬁcation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
High Cost Loan (>300 BPS Indicator) -5380.333∗∗ -4209.989∗∗ -6103.414∗∗∗ -4812.295∗∗ 459.369
(1641.003) (1600.981) (1698.104) (1669.274) (1634.198)
Natural Log Loan Amount ($) 357635.493∗∗∗ 357275.542∗∗∗ 349441.680∗∗∗ 350827.003∗∗∗ 353033.859∗∗∗ 342232.735∗∗∗
(5574.955) (5550.877) (6559.253) (6645.564) (6739.726) (7122.377)
Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio -888.857∗∗∗ -909.249∗∗∗ -890.309∗∗∗ -910.060∗∗∗ -930.345∗∗∗ -1070.930∗∗∗
(129.091) (129.232) (128.930) (129.091) (129.231) (137.181)
Purchase Mortgage Indicator -416.320 754.422 -1175.342 139.626 -297.310 2268.437
(1783.927) (1823.201) (1821.053) (1874.947) (1853.167) (1783.402)
Monthly Payment to Income Ratio x 100 3441.360∗∗∗ 3259.839∗∗∗ 2566.984∗∗ 2574.925∗∗ 2918.574∗∗ -284.812
(656.430) (645.192) (912.080) (906.812) (897.500) (637.701)
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) Indicator 2809.899∗∗∗ 2810.707∗∗∗ 2824.371∗∗∗ 2821.947∗∗∗ 2804.637∗∗∗ 2778.075∗∗∗
(618.221) (617.885) (618.246) (617.873) (617.467) (617.711)
Current FICO Score/100 -5667.500 -5638.069 -6023.212 -5913.084 -6628.191 -4228.130
(8611.260) (8614.766) (8634.703) (8638.126) (8589.480) (8664.730)
Current FICO Score2 542.796 540.360 575.684 565.796 630.021 418.600
(740.028) (740.175) (742.305) (742.439) (738.004) (745.022)
Log Quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI) -11742.149∗∗∗ -11637.025∗∗∗ -11755.667∗∗∗ -11647.580∗∗∗ -11689.870∗∗∗ -11842.296∗∗∗
(1294.411) (1301.494) (1294.268) (1301.344) (1300.977) (1301.853)
Log Quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI) 6 months lag 20571.680∗∗∗ 20433.054∗∗∗ 20583.473∗∗∗ 20438.104∗∗∗ 20477.183∗∗∗ 21290.201∗∗∗
(2698.643) (2734.808) (2698.411) (2734.684) (2734.493) (2737.676)
Monthly Unemployment Rate (MSA) x 100 -771.968∗∗∗ -768.160∗∗∗ -772.154∗∗∗ -768.551∗∗∗ -768.162∗∗∗ -716.738∗∗∗
(114.600) (115.130) (114.596) (115.131) (115.137) (115.233)
Interest Rate x 100 -2784.584∗∗∗ -2790.576∗∗∗ -2786.324∗∗∗ -2791.938∗∗∗ -2795.467∗∗∗ -2795.246∗∗∗
(104.266) (104.296) (104.248) (104.280) (104.250) (104.258)
Months Delinquent as of Current Month 3014.335∗∗∗ 3018.037∗∗∗ 3014.701∗∗∗ 3018.319∗∗∗ 3018.070∗∗∗ 3010.613∗∗∗
(183.825) (184.168) (183.826) (184.169) (184.165) (184.237)
Months Delinquent as of 3 Months Ago -3029.152∗∗∗ -3027.307∗∗∗ -3029.122∗∗∗ -3027.287∗∗∗ -3027.002∗∗∗ -3028.776∗∗∗
(135.488) (135.335) (135.488) (135.335) (135.335) (135.346)
Months Delinquent as of 6 Months Ago 508.868∗∗∗ 514.087∗∗∗ 508.687∗∗∗ 513.931∗∗∗ 514.241∗∗∗ 509.101∗∗∗
(97.818) (97.878) (97.815) (97.874) (97.874) (97.867)
Freddie Mac PMMS - Current Month x 100 -161.809 -131.713 -163.641 -133.229 -135.946 -90.947
(214.058) (215.205) (214.020) (215.162) (215.154) (214.994)
Post Modiﬁcation Indicator 7431.860∗∗∗ 8158.775∗∗∗ 7433.804∗∗∗ 8160.202∗∗∗ 8142.282∗∗∗ 8097.003∗∗∗
(399.244) (614.447) (399.291) (614.469) (614.085) (613.797)
Black\African American Indicator -9119.070∗∗∗ -8737.122∗∗∗ -9679.912∗∗∗ -6588.600∗∗
(2376.566) (2371.281) (2417.822) (2289.256)
Hispanic\Latino Indicator -12752.092∗∗∗ -12482.697∗∗∗ -12968.622∗∗∗ -9415.359∗∗∗
(1710.775) (1720.442) (1737.305) (1643.384)
Asian\Hawaiian\Paciﬁc Islander Indicator -4841.686 -4691.107 -4795.733 -5890.081∗
(3000.983) (3028.325) (3031.288) (2961.130)
Modiﬁcation Indicator x Black -167.976 -168.828 -169.703 -157.892
(1296.313) (1296.346) (1296.401) (1295.647)
Modiﬁcation Indicator x Hispanic -1355.592 -1354.928 -1353.485 -1343.973
(817.786) (817.780) (817.734) (817.487)
Modiﬁcation Indicator x Other -1199.860 -1200.471 -1200.622 -1203.534
(1229.639) (1229.692) (1229.720) (1229.057)
Natural Log Income ($) 9582.537 7546.214 5777.947 22254.273∗∗∗
(5789.877) (5774.527) (5722.897) (5324.763)
Constant -4138312.542∗∗∗ -4125483.643∗∗∗ -4137911.897∗∗∗ -4125395.571∗∗∗ -4133314.183∗∗∗ -4188159.614∗∗∗
(73861.055) (73299.505) (73643.037) (73152.863) (74028.891) (76843.473)
Servicer Fixed Eﬀects No No No No No Yes
Total Observations 223,352 223,352 223,352 223,352 223,352 223,352
Unique Loans 5,745 5,745 5,745 5,745 5,745 5,745
R2 within 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041
R2 between 0.877 0.879 0.877 0.879 0.878 0.888
R2 overall 0.857 0.859 0.857 0.859 0.858 0.868
Source: Corporate Trust Services (CTS)
Performance period: December, 2006 - May, 2010
Loan Origination Year: 2005
Model: Random Eﬀects Linear Regression
Dependent Variable: Current Balance
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
31